

Секция 1

МЕТОДОЛОГИЯ МЕЖДИСЦИПЛИНАРНОГО СИНТЕЗА: ИННОВАЦИОННЫЕ И ЦЕННОСТНЫЕ ПОВОРОТЫ

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PROMOTING COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE MARKET

СТИМУЛИРОВАНИЕ КОНКУРЕНЦИИ НА РЫНКЕ ТЕЛЕКОММУНИКАЦИОННЫХ УСЛУГ

В статье представлена дилемма между конкуренцией, основанной на услугах, и конкуренцией, основанной на инфраструктуре. Конкуренция представляет собой мощный инструмент в решении всех проблем стимулирования одновременно. Политика доступа выделена как важнейший элемент регулирования телекоммуникационного сектора. Несмотря на популярность, регулирование доступа с помощью ЕСРР не создает достаточно стимулов для снижения цены. Метод ценового потолка может стать полезным инструментом в данной сфере.

Regulatory regimes like the one in telecommunications aim to achieve conflicting goals simultaneously, that is converge the goals of producers and consumers. The enterprise is immanently destined to reach for the maximum of profits what conflicts with the lowest possible price (at marginal cost) the customers desire.

In telecommunications sector the situation in retail markets is strictly affected by the structure, prices and regulation of access markets.

Access price regulation alone is highly insufficient as a regulatory instrument to simultaneously encourage efficient use of the infrastructure, support policies for universal service, allow the infrastructure owner to recover fixed network cost, to give incentives for cost reduction in the provision of infrastructure, to give incumbent and entrant network operators correct incentives to invest in new infrastructure. Another instrument seen to be potent enough to deliver efficiency in all dimensions simultaneously is competition.

Although in telecommunications industry building an ideal form of competition is impossible, it appears to be a promising idea to use as much competition as possible and regulation no more than necessary [1, p. 30]. Encouraging competition where appropriate, regulators can sometimes resolve fundamental incentive problems [4, p. 201].

It constitutes the main rationale for the deregulation of telecommunications sectors and the increased reliance on access regulation rather than retail price regulation. The bottleneck is regulated, while competition in

services is made possible by access regulation. In the face of technological advancement the natural extension of the policy of deregulation is to encourage facilities-based competition (transformation of natural monopoly into a potentially competitive markets).

Once competition is developed to the point where it can be maintained with the general competition rules, it's desirable to dismantle sector-specific regulation [3, p. 22].

Facilities-based competition is a pre-condition for competition to evolve and hence, pre-condition for dismantling regulation. Although the benefits of facility-based competition should be weighted against the cost of duplication of the infrastructure.

The implementation of facility-based competition can be fostered by mandating access at initial stages at the terms that favor the entrants. It is should result in more market shares of the entrants and their better financial settings (incentives for the new firms to invest in own infrastructure). With the development of competition and the increasing shares of market entrants', access regulation is made less favorable for the entrants [2, p. 717-727].

There are policies promoting competition at various levels of the value chain — pure service provision (originating and terminating access in long-distance telephony), resale entry (resale of fixed telephony subscription services), mixed or unbundled entry (resale entry and facilities-based entry), facilities-based entry.

When fostering unbundling and interconnection, it's important to provide sufficient incentive for the network owner to invest in network reliability and modernization [4, p. 229].

Key concern of the regulator should be to encourage only efficient entry. The Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) is a method for creating incentives for efficient entrants to enter the market. According to the method ECPR, the access price should be set at a level that compensates the network owner both for the cost of providing access and for the loss of profit due to lost sales and the ensuing loss of mark-up (opportunity cost). A version of the simple ECPR has emerged recently as «margin squeeze», where dominant operator provides access at a cost that is so high that the entrant can not reasonably compete — margin between the access and retail price is not big enough to cover cost in the retail stage. However, the method provides very poor incentives for curbing the retail price, if the retail price was initially at the monopoly level [1, p. 33].

Efficient access competition providing correct incentive for competitive investment in infrastructure can be provided by price cap regulation [3, s. 4.7].

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INNOVATIVE PUBLIC REVENUE POLICY TO PROMOTE GLOBALIZATION AND SUSTAINABILITY

ИННОВАЦИОННАЯ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННАЯ ПОЛИТИКА ДОХОДОВ В ЦЕЛЯХ СОДЕЙСТВИЯ ГЛОБАЛИЗАЦИИ И УСТОЙЧИВОСТИ

Все люди имеют равные права на природные возможности. Плата за использование природных возможностей должна производиться из прибыли и не должна увеличивать издержки. Благодаря этому улучшатся международная конкурентоспособность и устойчивость.

I propose that the public revenue policy of a nation should be based on the principle that all people have equal rights to natural opportunities. If this is accepted, what follows?

First, it will be important to identify the scope of natural opportunities. The primary component of «natural opportunities» is land, both the value of agricultural land in an unimproved condition and the part of the value of urban land that is not due to infrastructure. But there are a number of other components as well. There are energy resources and minerals, fresh water in rivers and aquifers, fish in rivers, lakes and seas, birds in the sky, the frequency spectrum, the capacity of the environment to absorb harmful wastes, and perhaps others.

To give expression to the idea that all people have equal rights to natural opportunities, those who use natural opportunities in ways that exclude others or who use natural opportunities in ways that impose costs on others should be required to pay for their actions. The first practical implication is that every person or organization with the right to use land should be required to pay a monthly rent bill equal to the rental value that the land would have if it had not been improved. The amount of the rent that is due to infrastructure should go to the local government to maintain the infrastructure. The rest should go into a fund from which all citizens should benefit. The benefit could come either in the form of public services or in the form of a monthly income.